Abstract
Introduction
In this paper we argue that the disappointing performance of market liberalisation policies in promoting agricultural performance in sub Saharan Africa, especially in staple (semi-tradable) crops, results from weaknesses in the neo-classical theory on which liberalisation policies are based. After a brief description of the antecedents and mixed achievements of the liberalisation story, we discuss new institutional economic arguments which explain liberalisation's failures in terms of inherent difficulties in economic coordination in poor economies, difficulties which markets per se cannot overcome. (We define such economic coordination for the moment as coordination of individual economic agents' investments in complementary activities which are necessary for these investments to yield satisfactory returns -an example of such complementary investments might be farmers' investments in more intensive crop production and crop buyers' investments in higher volume and more extensive crop purchase, processing and trading systems). We conclude by considering the policy implications of these arguments.
2 The liberalisation story Dominant (agricultural) development policy over the last forty years or so can be simplistically divided into two broad phases regarding the roles of states and markets in promoting development: state-and market-led development 1 .
Until the mid-seventies state-led development stressed the role of the state in actively intervening in, and taking over, strategic economic activities. Many countries set up monopolistic marketing parastatals in the immediate pre-or post-independence period to support the introduction and spread of more intensive methods and crops in smallholder agriculture. There were strong political and economic reasons for newly independent governments establishing or continuing with and extending the activities of these parastatals. Governments needed to take action, and to be seen to take action, to promote agricultural and rural development, as these sectors dominated national economies and employment. The private sector, on the other hand, was weak (as regards access to capital and human resources, and in organisational capacity) and poor market and infrastructural development in rural areas presented highly risky and unattractive investment opportunities. At the same time there were major coordination challenges in getting agriculture and rural economies moving: simultaneous investments (or investment commitments) were needed in communications infrastructure, in input and output trading, in research and extension, and in farmers' input purchases and production.
State intervention offered a means of addressing all these problems: it could provide a coordination mechanism across trading, infrastructural, research and extension investments and activities; it could access official finance sources; it could coordinate with farmers; it could both reduce and take on systemic investment risks in ways that the private sector could not; and it could invest in the organisational and human resource development necessary to develop working systems
In addition to these very practical problems facing private sector led agricultural development, problems which it was thought state intervention could address, there was often a deep mistrust of private companies, which were seen to be dominated by or associated with former colonial interests. In many countries socialist philosophy was suspicious of the private sector and of markets, with a belief in the need for the state to actively intervene to direct the economy to achieve both productive and welfare objectives. At the same time there was great confidence in the ability of the state, and dominant economic development theories stressed the importance of industrial sector development, and the taxation of agriculture to finance this. State involvement in agricultural marketing activities was a convenient tool for such taxation. It was also a convenient tool for extending personal, party and state power and patronage into rural communities.
By the early 1970s, agricultural parastatals were found throughout sub Saharan Africa, engaged in input supplies, seasonal credit disbursement (and sometimes recovery), and crop purchases. They were often supported by donor funds and monopolistic / monopsonistic regulations, and promoted pan-territorial pricing. Their scope varied, in some countries a single parastatal might have responsibility for a range of food and export crops, together with input sales, while in others countries different parastatals had specific responsibility for a particular crop sub-sectors or for particular marketing activities. During the 1970s they were frequently linked in with integrated rural development programmes and projects.
At the same time, however, the weaknesses of most parastatals were becoming more and more evident, and during the early 1980s donor support began to be withdrawn and indeed turned to hostility. There was increasing recognition of major problems with parastatals themselves and with the whole state led development approach of which they were a part 2 . Fundamental operational problems included the absence of clear (profit driven) disciplines promoting efficiency, susceptibility to political interference for short term political and private gain, corruption, and lack of technical and marketing innovation. Wider economic or system problems resulted from the large fiscal burden resulting from the operational inefficiencies and difficulties listed above, from discouragement of private investment, and from price distortions stifling incentives for farmers and others to make wider economically (rather than financially) optimal investments (as a result of panterritorial pricing and implicit taxation of export crops).
The response to this of policy analysts and donors was based largely on neo-classical theory, narrowly defined for our purposes as theory that "postulate(s) maximising behaviour plus interactions through a complete set of perfectly competitive markets" (Hoff 2000, p2) . This response limited the functions of the state to provision of 'public goods' narrowly defined as goods and services which are non-excludable and non-subtractable (and which therefore will not be supplied by market mediated actions by private agents). In agriculture public goods have been generally been recognised as including agricultural research into pro-poor technologies; dissemination of information about these technologies (classical extension); market regulation & information; and physical infrastructure (primarily roads & telecommunications). Physical infrastructure is also, of course important for wider economic development, as is the provision of a generally stable and favourable macro-economic environment. Increasing emphasis has also been placed, over time, on the development of institutions supporting market development (see for example recent World Development Reports) and also on "social action funds" to flexibly assist poor short-term losers from the stabilization and liberalization processes. Accompanying the narrower definition of legitimate state activities were actions to promote more efficient and less distorted operation of agricultural markets, with privatization of agricultural marketing organisations (generally de-linking credit, input & output markets), deregulation of these markets, and elimination of credit, inputs & output subsidies.
Empirical challenges to agricultural liberalisation orthodoxy
The results of liberalisation have not, however, been universally beneficial in getting going the rural economies and agricultural sectors of liberalising countries. Table 1 presents summary figures for agricultural sector performance over different regions in different parts of the world from 1960. Major points to note from this are that across low income countries (excluding China and India) agricultural growth has been fairly constant from the 1960s to late 1990s, marginally positive in per capita terms. However, for (predominantly low income) countries in sub Saharan Africa despite slightly higher rates of growth in the second half of this period, such growth was still negative in per capita terms and was achieved largely by extensification in cereal production (with falling rates of fertiliser use). While the data on which low estimated agricultural growth rates for Sub Saharan Africa have been criticised as not reflecting dynamic growth that exists in Sub Saharan African agriculture (for example Wiggins 1995) , and of being over sensitive to the effects of price changes and currency devaluations (for example Block 1995) , the general picture of low or negative per capita growth in agriculture in much of Sub Saharan Africa over the last 30 years is supported by the high incidence and severity of rural poverty in Sub Saharan Africa as compared with other regions, widespread reports of agricultural stagnation (for example Bryceson 2000) , and data on fertiliser use and yields (see for example Dorward et al. 2001, p18-19 ).
It appears, therefore, that although agricultural liberalisation may have been beneficial in poor countries with good infrastructure, diversified agriculture and a diversified rural economy and in lower-middle income countries in which production of staples has ceased to be the basis of the livelihoods of the majority of the poor. In many poorer countries, however, (those with no prior agricultural transformation, with weak infrastructure and with a high dependence on staple crop production) it is not supporting sustainable agricultural intensification. There are some benefits. Poor rural and urban consumers in southern Africa appear to have benefited from reduced food prices for processed staples (Jayne and Jones 1997) . There have also been positive impacts in the supply chains for some cash crops in some countries, but the record here is mixed (see for a discussion of cotton, for example). There has, however, been a notable lack of success in the development of input, output and financial markets offering attractively priced, timely and reliable services that are critical for more intensive crop, and particularly cereal, intensification in poorer rural areas. Thus while few would argue that the pre-liberalisation situation could or should have been sustained, and in most cases was also failing to deliver these services, liberalisation has not delivered the substantial improvements in agriculture which were expected and are needed to drive rural poverty reduction and increased food security.
There are three principal explanations for this lack of success. Kherallah et al. 2000 and Jayne et al. 2002 , for example, argue that the principal problem is a lack of sufficiently thorough liberalisation, as fitful and often reluctant piecemeal liberalisation, together with real or perceived threats of policy reversals, reintroduction of price controls and regulation, and poor macro-economic management have depressed returns and increased risks to private sector investment. This may be termed the 'partial liberalisation' view. Alternatively (or additionally) slow development of markets is explained by weak institutions supporting market and private sector development. Attention in this 'weak institutions' view tends to focus on cultural, political and legal factors that undermine clear property rights and hence investment incentives (see for example [World Bank 2002 , 2003 .
Both the 'partial liberalisation' and 'weak institutions' views are basically supportive of the liberalisation agenda and are consistent with its basic neo-classical tenets, although (particularly in the latter case) recognising the importance of state support for institutional public goods necessary for markets to work 3 . The third explanation for liberalisation's lack of success is much more critical of the basic liberalisation agenda. It is this explanation that is explored and developed in this paper. First, in the rest of this section, we extend the empirical challenge to liberalisation by not only pointing out its lack of success in sub Saharan Africa, but by arguing that global historical experience suggests that dramatic poverty reducing growth has not generally been achieved in the context of liberalised markets, or liberalised market development. We then consider theoretical explanations for this (focussed around institutions, coordination failures and low level equilibrium traps) before considering the policy implications of these explanations.
A challenging question that has not, to our knowledge, been properly answered asks for historical examples of rapid pro-poor growth in poor agricultural economies in the context of liberalised markets, and for evidence that such growth can occur. , forthcoming observe that instances of widespread and rapid pro-poor growth in poor rural areas in the 20 th century have almost all started from agricultural transformations, principally through intensive cereal based growth (green revolutions). Amongst these, state led investment has been widespread, not only in infrastructure, research and extension, but also in establishing and operating institutional arrangements for input finance and supply (and often for produce purchase as well), price stabilisation & support (with investment in dispersed and guaranteed output markets), and in input and farm finance subsidies. Dorward et al. suggest a common three phase pattern in the establishment of conditions for successful green revolutions (see figure 1 ). Phase I involves basic interventions to establish conditions for productive intensive cereal technologies. With these in place, a small number of farmers with access to seasonal finance and markets may take up these technologies, but more rapid and widespread uptake requires government interventions (in phase 2) to enable farmers to access seasonal finance and seasonal input and output markets at low cost and low risk. This 'kick starts' a broad based agricultural transformation and once volumes of credit and input demand and of produce supply have built up, with growing volumes of non-farm activity arising from growth linkages transaction costs per unit will fall. Phase 3 then involves market liberalisation.
This process is not without its difficulties. These arise in managing interventions effectively and efficiently, as shown in our earlier discussion of parastatal failures in sub Saharan Africa countries. There are also political pressures to continue with these market interventions and subsidies when they are no longer necessary (and are indeed harmful).
Empirical study of the hypothesis set out in figure 1 has been limited, due largely to lack of theoretical and policy attention to these issues. The hypothesis is, however, compatible with the Adelman and Morris' empirically based framework of factors determining economic development (Adelman and Morris 1997; Gaur 1997) . Fann et al. 2003 test the hypothesis in India over the period 1960 to 2000. They find high agricultural growth and poverty reduction payoffs from government investments in the 1960s and 70s in credit subsidies, in roads, in fertiliser subsidies, in agricultural research on HYVs, and in power subsidies (in order of descending poverty reduction returns in the 60s and 70s). Returns to these decline markedly over the two following decades, to the extent that they become non-significant or negative. Roads are the exception to this, showing consistently high (indeed the highest returns) in the later decades, when returns to educational investments (which are low in the earlier periods) rise (see table 2).
Theoretical challenges to agricultural liberalisation orthodoxy
It appears, then, that empirical evidence challenges the liberalisation orthodoxy: there is little empirical evidence of liberalisation successfully supporting rapid and widespread pro-poor growth in poor rural areas, but there is evidence for some successful state intervention 4 . What theoretical explanations are there for the balance of this evidence, and how can these explanations guide policy and research? We consider first systemic economic problems facing poor rural areas. This leads us to focus on coordination problems in these areas, and we consider insights into these problems from different branches of institutional theory.
Poor rural areas are typically characterised by a daunting set of generic problems which include poor roads and telecommunications; poor human health; lack of a well developed and diversified monetary economy; thin markets for agricultural inputs, outputs and finance; and a (particularly agricultural) business environment characterised by weak information (on prices, on new technologies, and on potential contracting counter-parties), difficult and weak contract enforcement, high risks (which we discuss below); and high transactions costs, which we define as the costs of protecting oneself against risks of transaction failure by searching for and screening potential contracting counter-parties and their goods and services, then negotiating and contracting with them, and monitoring and enforcing their adherence to the contract. A critical feature of transaction costs as defined here is that agents incur them in order to reduce the risks of transaction failure 5 . This distinguishes transaction costs from transformation costs, the costs of making or growing things or physically providing services, including transport services.
While it has long been recognised that agriculture in poor rural areas tends to be highly risky (Chambers 1983) , consideration of risk has tended to focus on vulnerability to natural (weather, pests, sickness) and market (price) shocks. Dorward and Kydd 2002, however, identify risk of transaction failure as a further major risk. They describe these three types of risk as the 'systemic investment risks' of poor rural areas, recognising that the high risks that investors face in all three risk categories present a particularly intractable set of development problems as they lower productivity by (a) distorting investments away from those that maximise expected returns towards those that reduce risks under adverse conditions, (b) directly lowering the average returns to investment within the economy, and (c) generally discouraging investments as a result of both reduced expected returns and risk aversion of investors.
Transaction risks, however, have particularly damaging effects, as they undermine the very processes of exchange and specialisation necessary for economic growth. Dorward and Kydd 2002 identify two major transaction risks as (a) coordination risks and (b) risks of opportunism. Coordination can be defined as "effort or measures designed to make players within a market system act in a common or complementary way or towards a common goal" ). Economic coordination failure can then be defined from two different (complementary) perspectives. In terms of its direct effects on individual investors, it is the failure to make an investment due to a possible absence of complementary investments by other players at different stages in the supply chain (modified from . In terms of wider processes and impacts, economic coordination failure occurs "where individuals' failure to coordinate complementary changes in their actions leads to a state of affairs for everyone that is worse than some alternative state of affairs that is also an equilibrium" (Hoff 2000) . Even in a basically profitable supply chain, coordination failure can arise as a result of coordination risks (the risk of failure of an investment due to the absence of complementary investments by other players at different stages in the supply chain) or risks of opportunism (risks from another player who has made complementary investments having an effective monopoly in the supply of a critical service and thereby capturing an undue share of the revenue in the supply chain, or delivering sub-standard goods or services whose quality cannot be easily assessed when entering a contract). Examples of opportunism include loan default by farmers; low produce prices offered by traders at harvest time (when farmers are desperate for cash) or in remote areas (where farmers have no other sales outlets); sale of poor quality or adulterated inputs; and use of inaccurate/ loaded weights and measures. Coordination failure can constrain agricultural intensification by simultaneously depressing investments by the same set of mutually dependent investors: input suppliers (who need to invest in input supply systems and stock); financiers (who need to invest in farmers and traders); farmers (who need to invest in input purchases and labour); and traders (who need to invest in crop marketing systems, transport and purchases).
A critical concept here is that of a low level equilibrium. This occurs because the set of generic problems discussed above are mutually self sustaining in a vicious cycle of under-development, illustrated in figure 2. At the heart of this are depressed investments, thin markets, coordination failures and weak institutions (for coordination or contract enforcement).
The concept of low level equilibria is not, of course, new. Rosenstein-Rodan 1943 argued that markets at the early stages of development may not coordinate activities needed for development, due to spillovers or externalities between different sectors (for example in infrastructural development, skills and knowledge development, or falling costs of intermediate products), for example such that investment in each single sector may not be profitable when investment in all of them is. Hoff 2000 describes more modern and robust models of the persistence of low level equilibria despite positive individual changes such as "good mutations" of existing institutions, technological "silver bullets" or improved resource prices. Persistence occurs where spillovers are widespread and diffuse, preventing a "Coasian" solution through negotiation and institutional innovation by private agents. These models, together with different strands of new institutional economics theory, provide a variety of explanations for and insights into both the existence of low level equilibrium traps and the potential for and difficulties in escaping to more favourable equilibria or growth paths. We briefly review three different NIE 'strands' which have implications for our understanding of coordination problems in poor rural areas (we characterise these under the writing of North, Williamson, and Hall and Soskice), and some more formal models of coordination failure as described by Hoff 2000. In considering these we use the distinction made by Davis and North 1971 between the institutional environment (" the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution") and institutional (or contractual) arrangements ("arrangement(s) between economic units that governs the way in which these units can cooperate and/or compete").
North has made a seminal contribution by examining the political economy processes of institutional change (Davis and North 1971; North and Weingast 1989; North 1990; North 1995) . Institutional change is examined as an evolutionary process where powerful groups respond to changes in relative prices, technologies and transaction costs by modifying institutions in ways that they perceive to be in their interests. In different situations the same sets of changes may stimulate very different types of institutional change promoting, in broad terms, a "pro-development" form (structuring transactions to promote trade and investment) or an "anti-development" form (structuring transactions to create rents and, in the process, creating the possibility of a low level equilibrium trap). There is a strong path dependency in these processes, as initial conditions play an important role in determining the relative perceptions and power of different groups, and the institutional and technological options that they face. Hoff 2000 uses the term 'ecological economics' to characterise a key insight here: that the opportunities and behaviour of agents, and hence the development path of the economic system, is determined as much by the nature and structure of interaction between agents as by the fundamental properties of the system (its natural endowments).
Williamson (Williamson 1985 (Williamson , 1991 Williamson 1994 ) takes a more micro-economic approach to analyse the way that agents, in the context of their institutional environment, structure their institutional arrangements, and this then influences the organisation of the economy with regard to choices to use firms, markets and relational contracts (or hierarchical, market and hybrid contractual forms) for exchange and coordination . The key insights relevant here are the influences on contractual form and transaction failure of asset specificity 6 , risk exposure, frequency of contracts, the nature of goods and services exchanged, the institutional environment, and human propensity for opportunism (see also Jaffee and Morton 1995; Dorward 2001) . Widespread relevance of this analysis to poor rural areas becomes apparent when it is recognised that asset specificity is the result of thin markets -in Williamson's analysis, based largely in industrialised economies, this is the result of specialised investments in plant or relationships, but this is a special case of a more general problem of thin markets. This underlies the core problems of coordination risk and risk of opportunism, as where the returns to an investment are dependent upon complementary action in a very thin market, any investment is subject to the risk that either no other actor will make the necessary complementary actions (risk of coordination failure), or that an actor who could make such actions has an effective monopoly and is able to capture an undue share of the revenue in the supply chain (risk of opportunism).
Williamson's conclusion for developed economies (that "non-standard contractual forms" often provide the best solutions) thus poses a poses a major challenge to market liberalisation dogma in poor rural economies where thin markets are pervasive, and calls for much more nuanced perspectives on, for example, interlocked markets, sharecropping, and local (private and state) monopolies. These may be the most efficient contractual forms, and indeed in many circumstances may be the only contractual forms which lower transactions costs and risks sufficiently to make transactions worthwhile and prevent complete supply chain failure. Policy attention then has to be focused on ways of permitting, even promoting, non-standard and sometimes monopolistic contractual forms while at the same time promoting efficient and equitable pro-development institutional change. These policy implications are nuanced because they are critical of more simplistic neoclassical economics perceptions of the universal benefits of markets and competition but are nevertheless fundamentally in favour of the private sector and of competitive processes.
Another institutional perspective on coordination is found in Hall and Soskice 2001 in their examination of 'varieties of capitalism' in OECD economies. They propose two "types" of national economy, at poles of a spectrum: Liberal Market Economies or LMEs (where activities are coordinated via intra-firm hierarchies, competitive market arrangements and vertical hybrid arrangements between firms in a supply chain) and Coordinated Market Economies or CMEs where there is more use of "non market relations to coordinate endeavours and to construct core competencies" with more extensive relational investment, more incomplete contracts, and more exchange of private information within networks. CMEs draw on a further set of organisations and institutions, supporting more horizontal or networked strategic interaction, both across and within supply chains.
Hall and Soskice find that the LME/CME distinction within the OECD is a distinction between the English speaking countries and the rest, and that LMEs tend to be specialised in activities characterised by radical innovation whereas CMEs tend to be specialised in activities requiring continuous technical innovation. There are clear theoretical arguments for this specialisation which are related to the need for coordinated strategic commitment for investment in specific assets. In CMEs this is achieved through various deliberative mechanisms that bring together the different actors and promote institutions for promoting and enforcing coordinated action and shared understandings of goals and distributive outcomes of such action. Governments may facilitate these deliberative and coordination processes, facilitate strategies which emerge from these processes, and actively promote particular coordination strategies. However although state facilitation is a prerequisite for CMEs, strong state action can also be problematic because of imperfect information, goal displacement, and firms' wariness of governments unilaterally changing the rules of the game.
Again this analysis is highly relevant to poor country smallholder agriculture facing serious background weaknesses in the institutional environment, a need for continuous technical innovation, and serious coordination failures, suggesting the need for a CME rather than LME type approach. It is also pertinent to note that historically LMEs have tended to be pioneers in specific sectors, but 'followers' have used state coordination to catch-up (and often overtake) these pioneers. State coordination is not, however, a panacea, and the analysis poses serious questions about appropriate roles for the state in promoting coordination.
Finally, we turn to consider more formal models of low level equilibrium traps and coordination failure. Building on Hoff's summary of work on 'underdevelopment traps' (Hoff 2000) we develop a simple model of coordination failure to (a) formally demonstrate simple mechanisms by which coordination failure may lead to under development traps and (b) highlight key variables determining the movement of an economy to low or high level equilibria.
This model builds on a structure used by de Meza and Gould 1992 to demonstrate the existence of two equilibria in property rights enforcement. In figure 3 we adapt this to describe some aspects of the coordination problem of poor rural areas. We examine the relationship between actors' costs and returns (on the vertical axis) and the volume of investments in a supply chain -for example in crop input delivery systems, seasonal farm finance, farm input purchases, and produce trading systems and purchases. We assume that all actors face a two stage investment problem, in which they must make stage 1 investments in assets specific to a particular activity in the supply chain in order to reap net revenues in stage 2. Their revenues in stage 2, however, are determined not only by the scale of their own stage 1 investments, but also by the scale of others' stage 1 investments. This relationship with others' investments is a result of potential coordination failure (limited stage 1 investment by others may mean that there is not sufficient supply or demand of complementary products or services to support full utilisation of the capacity generated by the actor's stage 1 investments) and of opportunism by other agents who, in a thin market, may be able to capture undue share of the surplus generated in the supply chain. Figure 3 separates out expected net revenues assuming no loss from coordination failure or opportunism from the risks of loss due to coordination failure and opportunism. We assume increasing and then falling returns to scale in activities, and risks of coordination failure and opportunism which decline with increasing total investment in the supply chain. The result is a threshold level of total supply chain investment below which individual actors in that supply chain incur losses and above which they reap profits. The total level of investment therefore has positive (or negative) spillovers, and positive (or negative) feedbacks above (or below) this threshold. Below the threshold no actors face positive incentives to invest, and hence the supply chain is caught in a low level equilibrium trap 7 . Above the threshold we may expect the dynamics of competition and technical and institutional innovation to further lower costs with time, with continuing increases in investment.
Simplistic though this analysis may be in a number of ways, it helps us to consider two processes by which a set of actors may escape from the trap: coordination, and threshold shifting.
Coordination requires deliberative processes and strategic investment commitment discussed earlier in the context of CMEs: from the logic of Figure 3 it is clear that coordination will not be achieved by market mechanisms alone. We classify non-market coordination mechanisms in terms of 'local' and 'extensive' coordination. Endogenous 'local' coordination mechanisms may develop either through vertical integration (effectively larger scale commercial farms) or through local relations linking different local agents interested in investing in different activities in the supply chain, for example through farmer groups or through interlocking arrangements by (generally powerful) traders. In staple crops, where total supply chain profits are likely to be more limited than in cash crops, progress in local investment is likely to be slow (as low returns weaken both the incentives to set up coordinating institutions and the penalties for defection). Eventually, however, if there is sufficient growth in local coordination mechanisms then these may in aggregate reach the threshold level of total investment in the supply chain, enabling a transition into a market based growth path. Left to itself this process is, however, likely to be slow and fragile, highly path dependent and susceptible to political economy processes of rent seeking (discussed earlier) and to shocks affecting the total investment threshold.
Alternatives to slow and fragile endogenous local coordination processes are (a) externally assisted 'soft' coordination processes (for example involving state or NGO support for the development of farmer organisations, for trader associations, or for contract grower, nucleus/ outgrower and other interlocking systems) or (b) more extensive 'hard' coordination where some strong central coordinating body with a mandate from the state ensures investments across the supply chain with highly credible coordinated commitments 8 . The African parastatal bodies discussed earlier attempted to follow the latter approach by taking over investments and investment risks for all parts of the supply chain except actual production, with the use of government and party regulations attempting to provide protection from both opportunism and some elements of market risk. This is not the only model for pursuing 'extensive coordination' but, as already discussed, highlights both the substantial difficulties facing the development of extensive coordination model and its record of some dramatic success.
The development of coordination mechanisms through endogenous local and through different types of external support will all be easier with a lower total supply chain investment threshold, and a low threshold will also ease the transition from non-market to market coordination. Figure 3 suggests that the threshold can be shifted to the left in three ways: by lowering coordination costs and risks, by lowering transaction enforcement costs and opportunism risks, and by raising expected returns net of transformation costs and risks. Each of these elements can be considered separately, and this suggests a valid agenda for technical and institutional change that lowers costs (particularly stage 1 costs), improves prices, promotes insurance and protects the different players against opportunistic behaviour by others.
Different coordination processes can also be examined in terms of the relationships between the development of the institutional environment supporting impersonal contractual arrangements and technological development which generally requires coordination between different links in increasingly complex supply chains including input suppliers, financiers, producers and output purchasers and processors. Figure 4 (from Dorward et al. 2003) provides a simple and highly stylised representation of this. Economic development is shown as a movement from the south west to the north east, with complementary progress in institutional and technological development: isocost and isoquant curves represent the costs and benefits in achieving different combinations of technical and institutional development. Poorly developed institutions cannot support the coordination required for highly advanced technologies, and therefore the south east of the diagram encounters market failure. In the north west corner, however, high levels of institutional development should allow effective competitive markets to support the coordination required for relatively simple technologies. Along the south west to north east diagonal there is more ambiguity: institutional development may be insufficient for competitive markets to provide the coordination necessary for particular technologies' supply chains, but the coordination processes discussed earlier may be able to achieve this. We can use this analysis to examine different growth paths and processes for an economy, community or industry to move in a north easterly direction. While in any situation the 'optimal path' depends upon the shapes of the isoquant and isocost curves, there is no a priori reason for expecting it to be restricted to situations with 'all markets effective': a more natural expectation would be for the path to move across the middle of the diagram, as drawn with a mix of effective and ineffective competitive markets with non-market institutional arrangements. Endogenous local coordination would then involve small incremental movements in a north easterly direction, while more extensive 'hard' coordination, where successful, would allow more significants shift in a more east-north-east direction. Externally assisted 'soft' coordination processes would fall somewhere between these two extremes. Dorward et al. 2003 discuss in more detail the relative merits of and influences on different growth paths, but we note here the intuitive attractiveness of CME rather than LME routes, the latter involving movement in a much more northerly direction.
We conclude our discussion of theoretical challenges to agricultural liberalisation orthodoxy by pulling together some key points. First, perfectly competitive markets of the neo-classical theory underlying liberalisation policies do not ignore coordination problems, coordination is achieved efficiently and effectively by markets. However they depend upon the products, processes and actors having certain (restrictive) characteristics and operating in the context of highly sophisticated institutions with adequate regulation & standards and effective state provision of public goods. They also depend upon competitive thick markets. Poor rural areas without these thick markets (and without many of the institutions, regulations, and technical and socio-economic characteristics required for efficient markets) then face a 'catch 22' situation: where does coordination (needed to get the market working) come from when the market is not working?
We therefore put forward arguments that non-market arrangements are necessary to provide the coordination necessary to induce private agents to invest in specific assets for different activities in a supply chain. In addition to the very practical difficulties faced in achieving this non-market coordination, however, there is an underlying theoretical (and also very practical) difficulty and 'catch 22' with inherent contradictions in the transition from a non-market to a market coordination system: effective non-market coordination generally requires a limited number of strong coordinating players at some point in the supply chain (to allow personal coordination mechanisms to work), but market coordination requires a much larger number of players at all points in the supply chain to allow impersonal competitive forces to operate. How can one move from one coordination system to another without destroying the confidence in thick markets which must be the foundations of market coordination? Solutions to this problem are likely to involve movements from 'hard' external and extensive coordination mechanisms to softer forms of external coordination assistance as part of an evolutionary transition process.
Policy Implications
We consider the policy implications of the coordination arguments made above first by making some more general observations about policy processes and context, and then by making more specific suggestions for moving policy forward.
A key 'broad' policy message from this analysis is that we need a policy framework that recognises the importance of stages of development and of endogenous 'political economy' processes in institutional change. These 'stages of development', as illustrated in figure 2, demand different types of policy and institutional development at different stages (Adelman and Morris 1997) and while India seriously needs to liberalise and reduce agricultural support, but current Indian debates (and advocated solutions) should not be carelessly "copied across" to most SSA smallholder agriculture. The endogenous dynamics of policy and institutional development at these different stages also need to be allowed for in policy analysis: it is not enough to argue, for example, that agricultural liberalisation policies have failed because governments have not 'let go' and implemented these policies thoroughly enough: policy analysis must recognise the legitimate concerns which prevent governments from completely 'letting go' of, for example, staple food markets.
The second broad policy message is that coordination mechanisms need to be given a much more prominent place in policy thinking. We suggest below particular institutional approaches by which coordination might be achieved, and conceptual 'filters' for examining these, but for these to be developed and implemented we need to pursue (through action research) an "institutionalist" and experiential approach to smallholder agricultural development, based on business models that convince private investors and focus on coordination and networks. This will often require commitment to public subsidies to the private sector for commercial service provision in rural areas. This, and other proposals that rub against neoclassical prejudices should not be automatically ruled out: non-standard contractual forms, regulated monopolies and a prominent coordinating role for the state (& others?) may all have their place, though they must also be rigorously designed and governed to overcome historical failures with these types of intervention.
What then should be the roles of governments in promoting economic coordination in poor rural areas? The theory of low level equilibria suggests that they should attempt to induce movement from the current low level equilibrium, movement that is sufficiently far reaching that the economy will reach new equilibrium. This can involve action on a number of fronts broadly conceived of as identification of 'critical missing links' causing coordination failure across a supply chain and of cost effective mechanisms for lowering risk and raising expected secure returns to a level that provides opportunities for productive investments that both promise and deliver returns sufficient to attract private agents to invest in these missing links.
These mechanisms may involve technical change to increase productivity or reduce productivity risks; price intervention to increase profitability or reduce market risks; and institutional change to reduce the costs and risk of coordination failure and / or transaction enforcement failure. Examples of some of these mechanisms include investment in communications infrastructure, or support for (regulated) monopolies; franchises, trader and farmer associations to address coordination failures and risks from opportunism (but these generally face major governance challenges); grain reserves, price intervention and guarantees, market information systems, market infrastructure development, commodity exchanges and insurance systems to address vulnerability to shocks (although these face major problems of moral hazard & adverse selection); and price support, input/output/credit subsidies, communications infrastructure, technical research and extension, and support for trader and farmer associations to increase basic supply chain profitability.
Classical underdevelopment equilibrium theory proposed a "big push" with a leading role for the state on many fronts. The more recent literature is (rightly) more wary of government led coordination (although as argued earlier large scale coordination has, on some occasions but not others in the 20th century, achieved rapid widespread growth). Failures in achieving sustained success with state led approaches include not only rent-seeking, but also a lack of inventiveness, with "premature greying" in Sachs' terminology. Where a 'big push' strategy is to be followed, then the timing of this and the design of time limits and exit and market transition strategies are critical. These have to be linked in with more general questions about ways in which trade and domestic policies support appropriate institutions.
Governments, however, while having an overall responsibility for encouraging coordination as a public good are not the only agents who can promote it: producer, processor and trader associations and NGOs all have interests and potential complementary roles. Whatever the agency by which coordination is promoted, however, the theory discussed earlier suggests useful conceptual 'filters' for examining specific proposals. Thus proposals should address missing markets in the short term while laying the basis for longer term market development and reduce transactions costs and risks for key players in supply chains. They also need to address constraints on a sufficiently broad front, not relying on too much on 'silver bullet' technologies or individual business / institutional innovations without complementary improvements in institutions and mechanisms for coordination as single interventions may not be able to break out of a low-level equilibrium. The timing of proposed interventions is also critical, as they must build on and into existing opportunities, be sufficiently large scale and long term to change perceptions, but not attract rent seeking and remain in position long enough to be subverted by premature greying. The planned complementary roles of government and of other players, is critical in this, with clear objectives, roles and mechanisms for intra-sectoral non-market coordination, and clear exit and transition pathways.
Conclusions
Overcoming economic coordination failures in poor rural areas has been a largely unnoticed success and failure in the 20 th century. As we enter the 21 st century policy makers, analysts and researchers need to give much more attention to understanding the nature of coordination failures, their effects, and opportunities for overcoming them. Hoff 2000 suggests that new understanding of coordination failures means that 'development may be both easier and harder than (analysts) previously thought 9 . This is because the existence of thresholds means that (in theory) once a threshold is crossed, further growth and development is a self-sustaining process, reducing the resources needed for significant development impacts. However, first understanding the binding constraints causing coordination failure in a supply chain, and then designing and implementing mechanisms for overcoming this are very difficult. Furthermore, not only can ill judged interventions make matters worse, but the challenges to the development of local coordination mechanisms may be greater now (in an increasingly global economy) than they were in the past (Dorward et al. forthcoming) . Whatever the changing difficulties of development, a focus on overcoming coordination failures involves a different set of policy, analytical and research approaches from that of either current liberalised market approaches or earlier state led approaches. This is a major challenge to those working for significant poverty reduction in those parts of the world where severe rural poverty is most entrenched. 
